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THREATS AND CRIMINAL
DETERRENCE IN SEVERAL
DIMENSIONS
Saul Levmore*
Ariel Porat**
This Article's claim is that deterrence in criminal law is composed of four oft-competing goals that ought to be taken into account
when calibratingsanctions. Consideran offender, such as an armed
robber or kidnapper, who threatens to commit a yet more serious
crime unless the victim surrenders. The first goal, or dimension, of deterrence is to deter the threat, or crime in general, and this suggests a
high sanction for the armed robbery or other threatening crime. A
second goal is to deter escalation, in this case the execution of the
threat once issued. This goal normally suggests a large gap between
the sanctions for lesser and greater crimes, in order to discourage escalation. Given a natural, or practical, ceiling to criminal penalties,
the suggested gap often implies a relatively low sanction for the lesser
crime, or threat, and some sacrifice of direct deterrence.
Two other goals, or dimensions, of deterrence have been unrecognized by academic commentators and legislatures. By extending the
analysis to include behavior by victims, it becomes apparent that law
ought to make the offender's threat incredible to victims. If the threat
can be weakened, victims will be less inclined to submit, and then offenders will have less reason to threaten in the first place. This third
dimension suggests a large gap between the sanctions for the lesser
(threat) and greater (execution) crimes; if the gap is small, victims will
recognize that the offender has little to lose from continuing on and
executing his threat, and these victims will submit and make the criminal's threatprofitable, thereby encouraging yet more criminal activity.
A fourth, equally novel, dimension of deterrenceis the ability of
law to make incredible the implicit promise by a threatenernot to escalate if the victim submits. When this implicitpromise is incredible,
victims will again tend not to submit to the threat, and offenders will,
* Saul Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
** Ariel Porat is the Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University, and the Fischel-Neil
Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
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in turn, issue fewer threats. To achieve this goal, the sanction for repeating a threat following submission by the victim should be low;
victims will be less apt to submit to a threatif they realize that submission will often bring on another crime, or threat. The idea-which
should be applied with caution-isfamiliarfrom blackmail; a victim
who thinks the blackmailer will return for further payments will not
pay the first time, and the blackmailer, in turn, will be discouraged.
Optimal deterrence requires that criminallaw should be attentive
to the four dimensions describedabove. This Article presents a model
for how law can better accomplish its deterrentfunction.
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INTRODUCTION

Ancient law punished only completed crimes, but law has evolved
to sanction many attempts and threats.' Moreover, many completed
crimes are platforms for escalation to more serious crimes, so that many

1. See Thomas Bittner, Punishment for Criminal Attempts: A Legal Perspective on the Problem
of Moral Luck, 38 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 51 (2008). The punishment of attempts is easy to understand.
When someone is apprehended just before committing a robbery, murder, or other serious crime, it is
almost impossible to imagine a developed legal system, or professional police force, that would be satisfied with preempting the crime and then simply warning the nascent criminal. See also LEO KATZ,
BAD ACrs AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 276-300 (1987) (discussing
attempts).
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crimes constitute implicit or explicit threats.2 Criminal activity often begins with a threat, or other low-level crime, because an offender prospers
if he can acquire something of value with mere words, the wave of a
weapon, or a low-cost wrong. These threats, as we will call them, are often cheap to inflict but terrifying to the victim. Modern law responds to
this reality by criminalizing "specific" threats as well as gateway crimes,
but this Article argues that the strategy is often misguided. Criminal penalties surely deter some threats, including low-level crimes that serve as
implicit threats, and may reduce crime by removing convicted threateners from the population, but, once a threat is made, the penalty makes it
more likely that an offender who threatens will carry out his threat.' The
offender may be insufficiently deterred because the additional penalty
for going beyond the threat is smaller than it would be if the entire deterrent were marshaled against the second step, or actual execution. In most
areas of criminal law, it is reckless to improve marginal deterrence by
simply lowering the penalty for the less-severe crime because this underdeters the less-severe crime. In the case of pure threats, there is more
room to reduce the penalty for the threat, or first step, but to see why this
is so requires an understanding of the credibility of threats.
These familiar deterrence goals are incomplete because they are
based on a fairly static analysis of the threatener's perspective alone. The
value of the threat to the offender depends in large part on the victim's
perceptions and likely response. If the victim finds the threat of escalation credible, and submits to the offender, the offender is better off, and
wrongdoers are encouraged to make such threats again. A novel argument in this Article, referred to as "primary credibility," is that by lowering sanctions for threats, law could make threats less credible and, therefore, less valuable to offenders. The counterintuitive idea is that when

&

2. The marginal deterrence factor is less important for attempts because, at least in principle,
law deters completed crimes by deterring their attempt. There is no time lag between the two, as there
is for a threat and its execution. It is easy to see why an offender apprehended one moment before
pulling a trigger should be punished and, if this were not the case, police would face impossibly difficult problems as they sought both to prevent harms and apprehend those likely to commit them. It is
because a threat can be an alternative, or a cheap substitute, for a completed crime that it is of special
interest. See Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 345, 346
(1992).
3. For a pathbreaking and excellent technical discussion of this intuition--and why it is not always correct once one takes costs and substitutions into account-see David Friedman & William
Sjostrom, Hanged for a Sheep-The Economics of Marginal Deterrence, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 34546 (1993) ("In such a situation, one of the considerations in setting punishments is the risk that a high
punishment for one crime may shift the offender to committing a different, and perhaps a worse,
one."). See also Shavell, supra note 2 (showing that where criminals can substitute between two acts,
optimal sanction for one might well be below the harm caused by the other to influence choice of
acts); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. EcON. 526, 528 (1970) ("Marginal costs are necessary to marginal deterrence."). The basic marginal deterrence idea has been recognized for 250 years or even 337 years in the Anglo tradition. See Friedman & Sjostrom, supra, at
345-46 nn.1, 5. For the best-known early statement, see JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION
201 (2d ed. 1871) ("Where two offenses are in conjunction, the greater offense ought to be subjected
to severer punishment, in order that the delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser."). Skepticism about marginal deterrence theory, and discussion of empirical evidence about general and specific deterrence, is best associated with another equally pathbreaking work, FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).

1336

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

the sanction attached to a threat is high, the sanction for executing the
threat becomes lower. When that latter sanction is lower, the threat becomes more credible and victims are more likely to submit. Submission
increases the offenders' profit and criminal activity. By lowering the
sanction for threats and focusing law's deterrence power on their execution, law can reduce the profitability and volume of criminal activity. To
be sure, the law might distinguish situations in which it is plausible that
victims have the time and capacity to make considered responses to
threats from situations in which they do not.
Our attention to credibility is a means of incorporating the victim's
perspective and likely response to a threat. It enables a dynamic analysis
in which the threatener's behavior depends, in part, on the victim's expected response, which depends, of course, on the perceived threat. In
turn, the analysis reveals a fourth dimension, or goal, of deterrence, that
has also gone unnoticed in the legal literature. We refer to it as "secondary credibility." The effect of a threat depends in large part on the credibility of the offender's implicit promise not to execute the threat, or not
to re-threaten, if the victim submits to the threat in the first place. Counterintuitively, if the sanction for re-threatening is low, victims will realize
that if they surrender to the first threat, another may well follow. This
can discourage submission in the first place, especially when victims have
time to plan ahead or think through their responses to criminal wrongdoing. In the long run, reduced submission makes criminal activity less
profitable.
The new dimensions introduced in this Article can be distinguished
from the more familiar marginal deterrence arguments. The latter aim to
deter the escalation of a crime; the armed robber, for example, is hopefully deterred from killing witnesses. In contrast, the credibility perspective adopts an earlier vantage point and seeks to deter criminal activity at
the outset.
These four dimensions of criminal deterrence--direct deterrence,
marginal deterrence of escalation, and then primary- and secondarycredibility effects---can be illustrated by considering a threatener, T, who
targets a victim, V. T threatens force unless V gives up something valuable. Assume that the sanction for using force is 20, and the sanction for
making the threat is 8, or alternatively, 1. When the penalty attached to
the threat is 8, the sanction for its execution, which is to say the actual
use of force, is only 12. That might be too low to deter T from executing
the threat he has issued.! If the sanction attached to the threat alone were
1, however, T might not execute on his threat because of the greater
marginaldeterrenceprovided by the sanction of 19, applied to an offender who uses force. The direct-deterrence dimension likewise considers
the threatener's perspective. If the penalty attached to the threat is lowered in order to increase marginal deterrence, there is the likelihood that
4. The actual threat of the sanction to the criminal is discounted, of course, by the probability of
apprehension. See infra note 34.
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offenders will be under-deterred and will issue more threats. This direct,
rather than marginal, deterrence consideration incorporates a substitution effect because offenders can be expected to gravitate toward, or substitute, threat-making as its sanction is reduced.' This substitution is insignificant if threats themselves are harmless, but it is plausible that
would-be offenders underestimate the injuries they will cause if they
wave guns in the air. And there are other reasons to be concerned about
threats; they impose anxiety costs, and some victims will submit to them
without pushing the threatener to decide whether or not to execute.
The third dimension is primary credibility, and its novelty derives
from incorporating the victim's perspective within deterrence theory. If T
is often undeterred by the marginal penalty of 12 rather than 19, then V
will find T's threat more credible when the sanction for the threat is 8 rather than 1. The less T is deterred from violently completing or escalating
the crime, the more V finds the threat of force credible. V will be more
likely to submit when threats are sanctioned and, correspondingly, a low
sanction for the threat might therefore reduce credibility and submission.
The primary-credibility effect refers to the feedback on T. As decreased
marginal deterrence for escalation makes T's threat more credible to V,
T is encouraged to threaten because V is more likely to submit. Remarkably, when law penalizes threats severely, it can make threat-makingwhich is to say,most crime-more profitable.
Finally, there is the dimension of secondary credibility, which is
most apparent in cases like blackmail, where repeat threats haunt a victim who has time to consider the best response to a threat. Imagine a legal system that punished only the first instance of successful blackmail
and provided no further penalty for a blackmailer who, after receiving
payment from a submissive victim, returned for more. Knowing this at
the outset, V is more likely to stand up to the blackmailer and refuse to
pay and, in turn, blackmail would become less profitable.
It is apparent that law's treatment of threats should depend on a
dynamic analysis that takes into account both the offender's and victim's
perspectives. To best structure criminal penalties, it is necessary to understand exactly how threats work and what makes them more or less
credible. Much as the marginal penalty expected by an offender affects
the victim's decision to submit to a threat, so too the credibility of the
threat as perceived by the victim affects the offender's threat-making.
The less credible a threat, the less likely a victim is to submit, and the less
profitable the criminal activity. Part II, therefore, begins with an exploration of the ingredients of credibility. The discussion continues to distinguish between primary and secondary credibility. The former refers to
the likelihood that the threat will be carried out if the victim fails to submit. It depends on execution costs, as the victim must believe that the
threatener will find it worthwhile to carry out his threat if the victim fails
5. The substitution label avoids the need to call it an underdeterrence, or inadequate direct
deterrence, problem. It also avoids confusing marginal and direct (activity-level) deterrence.
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to submit. Secondary credibility refers to the reliability of the threatener's claim that submission will indeed preclude execution or escalation.
The discussion concludes by challenging the conventional wisdom that
repeat play guarantees the credibility of threats.
Part III sets out the four dimensions of criminal deterrence. It begins by developing the marginal deterrence and substitution (direct deterrence) effects from the offender's perspective. The discussion suggests
that, in its different treatment of specific threats, as opposed to more
general threats, law may already reflect a sophisticated understanding of
the interaction between marginal deterrence and substitution.6 This distinction offers a window into the argument that we make about the benefit of allowing threats to go lightly punished. The analysis then introduces
victim behavior and explores the interaction between criminal sanctions
and the credibility of threats. The discussion suggests a revamping of
criminal penalties.
Part IV extends the analysis to include the risk that offenders can
sink costs to enhance credibility. When threats are involved, these sunk
costs enhance the credibility of the threat exactly as criminal penalties do
when attached to mere threats because both reduce the marginal deterrence to escalation. The strategy is most plausible where the first step involves a significant fraction of the overall costs. In turn, it can be a good
strategy to deter the offender at this first step, even though marginal deterrence with respect to the second, more serious, step is compromised.
The discussion explores the limits of this argument.
II. ASSESSING THREATS AND THE DANGER OF ESCALATION
A.

Prerequisitesfor Credibility

Targets will not respond to threats in a way that makes the threatener better off unless the latter's threats are credible and plausibly injurious. "Give me your wallet or I will shut down your university for a
day," is neither and is more likely to elicit puzzlement than fright or anyone's wallet. Threats are most credible when the cost of execution is low
compared to what the threatener is likely to gain.7 An extortionary arsonist needs but a can of gasoline and a few matches to make good on his
threat; if his threat to burn a shop owner's place of business is credible,
he might be able to use the same tools repeatedly against many victims,
and he might not even need to use the tools at all.
A threat can be contrasted to its opposite number, a contractual
promise, which pledges a benefit rather than a harm. In the absence of
6. Cf Pedro Celis, When Is a Youtube Video a "True Threat"?, 9 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS
227, 229 (2014) ("Requiring subjective intent reduces the potential chilling effect of § 875(c) by ensuring that only threats directed at specific individuals or groups are subject to liability.").
7. Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, Extortion,
and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1877, 1878 (1993); see also Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De
Geest, Carrots, Sticks and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 365-66 (2009).
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law, a threat of harm is often more credible than a promise of a benefit
because the promisor's execution costs are usually high.' For example,
when an employer promises a promotion and raise, the employer must
actually expend money to fulfill the promise and, of course, the promisee
must generally work hard to earn this money. In contrast, as noted, an
offender can threaten by waving a stick or other weapon. Understandably, law intervenes to raise the offender's execution costs; the extortionist
can wave a stick or fill a can of gasoline, but criminal law causes him also
to anticipate some probability of apprehension and criminal penalty. In
turn, shopkeepers can forego some defensive measures because they
count on law to deter threatening offenders.
Assume that a threatener, T, makes a threat and has the power to
execute it, and that T's target, or victim, V, knows this to be the case. Assume further that V will find it cheaper to submit to T than to suffer the
injury that T can bring about if he executes. When these conditions are
met we say that the threat has primary credibility. Of course, V may
submit and then find that T executes anyway. Prior to submission, V
must therefore be confident that submission will not be followed by execution and that T will not return at a later date to renew the threat. Thus,
one reason blackmail is not more common is that the target fears that the
blackmailer will demand yet more money, once the blackmailer learns
that the target will pay for the photograph (or other evidence regarding a
point of vulnerability) in question.' We call these matters of secondary
credibility. Note for now that when V contemplates submission, V must
estimate both primary and secondary credibility-the likelihood that T
will carry through on his threat (primary credibility) and also that T will
not execute despite submission by V or threaten again (secondary credibility). T, in turn, wants to be perceived as secondarily credible in order
to raise the probability that V will submit. The conventional means for T
to establish credibility is to have a history of reliability through repeat
play, a topic taken up below.o
However credible T's threat, V may, at times, be able to neutralize
the threat rather than submit to it. For example, V might respond to T's
threat of "your money or your life" by taking out her wallet and quickly
destroying its contents. Few criminal threats offer V this defensive op-

8. Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Rethinking Threats, (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ. U. Chi. L.
Sch., Working Paper No. 721, 2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edullaw-and-economics/738/.
See Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, supra note 7, at 367.

9.

See Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REv. 655,671 (1988)

(arguing that blackmail does nothing more than transfer wealth and that because there is no reason to
think that it is a transfer to a higher valuing user, and because resources are wasted in procuring and

hiding information, it is sensibly prohibited by law).
Blackmailers face problems with respect to both primary and secondary credibility. The first problem is one of correct pricing. If the blackmailer starts high and lowers his price in the event of nonsubmission, his threat seems weak because his primary credibility is weakened. And if he starts low
and then raises the price in the event of apparent submission, he seems secondarily unreliable.

10.

Infra Section II.C.
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portunity, though such "scorched earth" strategies are discussed later in
this Article."
B.

Execution Costs and Benefits

When T says, "Your money or your life," V knows that execution is
more likely the more money T thinks V possesses, and the easier it is for
T to grab that money without apprehension or injury to himself. Primary
credibility is therefore most likely where there are low execution costs.
And yet, secondary credibility is enhanced when V perceives that T's
execution costs-following V's submission-are high. This apparent
contradiction, or offset, is penetrated by considering T's varying
execution costs and benefits before and after V submits to the threat. In
particular, even when execution following submission is of low cost, if
there is nothing else for T to gain after V submits to the threat, V may
well find T's threat primarily and secondarily credible. We will return to
this point when we discuss how criminal law affects credibility and how
law might manage T's behavior following submission by V.12
The significance of execution costs is made plain by considering examples outside of the normal reach of criminal law, where execution
costs and credibility are divorced from the probability of apprehension.
If T says, "My group will boycott your business unless you do X," or, "I
will go on a hunger strike until you do Y," V can assess the cost of execution to T and calculate that the threat is increasingly incredible as that
cost rises. Setting aside the value of adding to T's reputation for reliability, the cost-benefit calculations are straightforward. If T threatens a
twenty-day hunger strike unless V volunteers for one day at the local
homeless shelter, V will doubt the threat's credibility, and will regard the
threat as a signal of intense feelings, to be sure, but not much more."
Matters can be further complicated when the victim's secondary
credibility is in play. Just as V must worry that submission will not guarantee safety, there are situations where T must be concerned about V's
reliability. Imagine that T threatens his employer: "I see you have discovered my embezzlements. If you report me to the police, I will burn
down your warehouse." If V submits, and the two parties agree that V
11. See infra note 54.
12. Infra Section HI.D.
13. Even where apprehension and criminal punishment are excluded, the parties can have difficulty assessing one another's costs and benefits and, therefore, credibility. Imagine a valued faculty
member who threatens his law school's dean as follows: "Raise my pay by $50,000 or I will move to
Law School Z." It is difficult for the dean to assess the threatener's cost and benefit of execution because of the obvious information asymmetry; only the threatener knows whether a move is costly or, in
fact, much desired from the threatener's perspective. It is difficult if not impossible to make such a
threat more credible without irrational self-destruction on one side or the other. Consider, for example: "My threat is real. If you do not submit, I will be gone, and to show you that I am not bluffing, if I
do stay without getting a raise, I will owe the law school, $100,000." No dean would "accept" this
promise, or seek to enforce it, because it encourages the very defection that the dean seeks to avoid
(although in the long run it might reduce defection). It is apparent that the high cost of execution
makes some threats less credible, but in virtually all cases it adds to secondary credibility.

No. 4]

THREATS AND CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

1341

will allow T to separate from the workplace quietly, there is the possibility that V will surprise T and have him arrested one year later. It is not
easy for T to overcome this credibility problem, and in turn it is likely
that such threats will be rare."4
C.

Repeat Play

If T is a repeat player, then it seems elementary that T's threats are
more credible because V will calculate that T has reason to execute in
order to establish a reputation as a credible threatener. T is also more reliable, or secondarily credible, than nonrepeat or anonymous threateners. In the most straightforward case, a criminal enterprise can demand
"protection" payments and garner an attractive, extortion-induced revenue stream with just the right level of threats and execution. Its primary
credibility is enhanced because a victim knows that the threatener has
more to gain from execution than does the typical mugger; future victims
have no way of knowing whether a mugger who confronts them has previously resorted to violence, but a storekeeper asked to make protection
payments by a criminal enterprise knows that violence by this threatener
is an investment that will cause other storekeepers to submit and may also know of prior violence.
The organized criminal enterprise further enhances secondary credibility by muscling out competitors so that victims will know that, if they
submit, their vulnerability will not make them prey to other offenders.'"
A terrorist enterprise that is organized around an ideology may be even
more formidable. If its frontline soldiers are trained to welcome martyrdom, then they are known not to fear the serious criminal sanctions attached to execution, and this improves primary credibility. And if the organization controls a population, then it is secondarily credible because
of repeat play and its ability to prevent copycat threats.1 6 Indeed, a government that pays a terrorist group to release hostages must have reason
to believe either that the group has the means to prevent repeat terror,
or that the government can prevent repeat terror and is simply paying for
the release of the hostages."
14. It is tempting to say that submission suffers from the same credibility problem as threats, or
indeed that V implicitly "threatens" to reverse any submission. Working backward, then, T will seek to
make a demand, like handing over a wallet, that V cannot easily reverse. Similarly, it is in T's interest
to make a threat that is both immediately and secondarily credible. V should submit, believing that
submission will preclude execution. As will become apparent, this is part of the strategy of increasing
marginal deterrence for executing a threat, by decriminalizing the threat itself.

15.

See Thomas C. Schelling, What Is the Business of Organized Crime?, 20 J. PUB. L. 71, 73

(1971) (arguing that one characteristic of organized crime is that it allows no competition and exercises
a monopoly); Shavell, supra note 7, at 1882 (stating that a threatening party may want to carry out a
threat when its demand has been rejected for the purpose of establishing a reputation).
16. This repeat play is more significant than most because the organization's goal makes it a
long-term player, without the end-period problem discussed presently in the text.
17. Harvey E. Lapan & Todd Sandier, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question, 78
AM. ECON. REv. 16 (1988) (arguing against the conventional wisdom that governments should not
bargain with terrorists over hostages to avoid encouraging further hostage-taking). Criminal enterprises enhance credibility in other ways. They reduce the end-game problem by operating over long time
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But the conventional wisdom, or intuition, about repeat play and
credibility is overstated. For one thing, even where repeat play surely
does enhance credibility, the matter is complicated both by the likelihood that V is also a repeat player, trying to build a reputation for nonsubmission, and the possibility that repeat play has an asymmetric impact
on reputation. Furthermore, past reliability does not provide much information about the future, except that it is better than past unreliability.
V does not know whether T is planning to make future threats or is in
fact in the last phase of a sting of sorts. Consider an identifiable, serial,
armed bank robber facing a victim who refuses to submit. If it is this repeat player's last hurrah, it is less profitable for him to shoot than it was
earlier in his criminal career. Firing his weapon and maiming a teller or
officer may allow the robber to steal a bank's cash, and thus obtain a direct benefit, but there is no need to invest in reputation, as this is his last
robbery. In contrast, someone who reliably performs as required by contracts may be setting up a target for a sting. A contractual partner must
always have her guard up in case this is the promisor's final act."
In sum, repeat play hardly guarantees credibility. In the absence of
repeat play, significant execution costs call credibility into question.
Threat-making is thus a tough line of work because credibility is not easy
to establish. But of course some wrongdoing begins with threats because
credibility is within reach and because when submission is forthcoming,
crime is a very profitable activity. The question in these settings is when
law should focus its deterrent power on threats and when it should reserve this power to forestall the serious harms brought about by the execution of that which was threatened.
III. MARGINAL DETERRENCE, SUBSTITUTION, AND CREDIBILITY
EFFECTS

This Part explores four dimensions that must be taken into account
by legislatures when setting sanctions for criminal activities initiated by
threats, including crimes that serve as threats of escalation to more serious crimes. The discussion begins with marginal deterrence and uses this
familiar tool to explain a fundamental distinction in criminal law between
specific and general threats. We argue that a plausible explanation for
the decriminalization of general threats is the legislature's desire to reserve enough marginal deterrence for the execution of the threat. We
then turn to the substitution effect-the risk of sacrificing direct deterrence if marginal deterrence for execution is enhanced-and explain the
periods; they lower execution costs through training and professionalization; they lower the expected
cost of apprehension by investing in relationships with police and with legal-defense teams and by
working to make any prison terms less painful for their members than they are to other convicted felons. They also enhance credibility through vigorous and well-advertised executions when targets fail to
submit.
18. Repeat play might, however, show the target that the threatener has no fear of the police or
is a "bad type." Still, the threat is less credible if the threatener is operating in his final period.
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tradeoff between marginal deterrence and substitution. Finally, we introduce two new dimensions, primary and secondary credibility. When the
sanction for threats is low, the primary effect is sufficiently powerful to
overwhelm the substitution effect. Counterintuitively, the lower the sanction for threats, the less threats will be used by offenders. The analysis
shows that when the sanction for escalation after submission, or for rethreatening, is low, threats become less credible.
A.

Generaland Specific Threats

Criminal law has been unresponsive to, or dismissive of, general
threats, or nonspecific threats made to a group of people. The typical requirements for a "criminal threat" include a victim in a state of reasonably sustained fear for his or her personal (or family member's) safety as
the result of a threat that is specific and unequivocal." The offender need
not actually intend to execute the threat and, indeed, may not have the
ability to carry it out.20 Thus, we can expect a finding of criminal wrongdoing when someone points a gun at a stranger and announces, "Your
money or your life," because the victim is singled out and has reason to
fear bodily harm. 2 1 In contrast, consider one who threatens: "I cannot
stand the noise you are all making; I hate you; if you do not shut up I'm
going to come back and make you sorry." In normal circumstances, this
threat is nonspecific both because it is aimed at a vaguely described
group, so that no one has particular reason to fear for his or her own
safety, and because it is equivocal in terms of timing and method. This
lack of specificity is apt to make a criminal conviction impossible as a
matter of law. 2 2 Without specificity, behavior may be regarded as wicked-but it is often not criminal until there is execution. At the very least,
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2016) ("[T]hat threat actually caused person threatened
to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or that of his or her immediate family; and that threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances"); People v. Toledo, 8 P.3d 1051, 1055
(Cal. 2000).
20. See Toledo, 8 P.3d at 1051.
21. In Illinois, for example, the threat is referred to as an "intimidation." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12-6(a) (2017) (including threats of physical harm to the victim, third parties, or property). Intimidation is a Class 3 felony, punishable by two to ten years of imprisonment. Once there is contact, or battery, the use of a firearm increases the penalty substantially. Battery is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison. Id. § 12-3(b). Aggravated battery using a firearm occurs when T
discharges a firearm and causes injury to V. Id. § 12-3.05(e)(1). This elevates the crime to a Class X
felony (six to thirty years), where the penalty also varies with other factors, such as the identity of the
victim.
Note that even if the threat described in the text rarely yields a profit to the wrongdoer, it is correspondingly inexpensive to impose. One weapon can be waved many times until a vulnerable target
submits. The same is not true for a beneficial promise, which in some ways is the mirror image of a
threat, and it is interesting that law has experimented with formalities and suits for dashed expectations primarily where promisors can be promiscuous, as with charitable gifts or expressions of intentions to marry. See Dari-Mattiacci & De Geest, supra note 7.
22. See Glenda K. Hamad et al., Nature of Threat, 19 CAL. JUR. 3D CRIMINAL LAW:
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES § 186 (2017) ("Unequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy, and specificity are not absolutely mandated but must be sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution to the victim.").
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some significant and active step is required to find that an attempted
crime has been committed.
There are conventional explanations for this difference between
specific and general threats. The exclusion of general threats from the
reach of criminal law is, for one thing, a convenient way of saying that
loose and angry talk should not normally be criminalized. It may be sufficiently common for people to say things in fits of anger that a general
understanding has developed that those who say ugly things when enraged, or under the influence of alcohol, do not have the intent required
to trigger criminal penalties. Experience may have shown that very few
of these general threats are harbingers of their execution, which is to say
violence, whereas a much higher fraction of specific threats turns out to
predict just what the threatener promised. At the same time, or perhaps
equivalently, most listeners are accustomed to angry words that amount
to nothing dangerous, or otherwise have no reason to be apprehensive
when at the receiving end of such a threat. Rather than chilling speech or
leaving an enormous pool of cases to prosecutorial discretion or juries'
inclinations, law requires specificity. A companion argument is that,
where general threats are concerned, it is more difficult to prove both intent and reasonable apprehension. 4 This latter explanation is more attractive because it is hard to see why speech directed at a specific individual, or simply containing sufficient details to qualify as a specific
threat, does not enjoy as much protection as speech that is vaguer or is
aimed at a dispersed group.
There is no reason to dispute this conventional understanding of
general and specific threats, but, especially when the threat is of the general kind, because it was directed at a group of people, it is not obviously
correct and it does not appear to reflect a social-welfare calculus. Within
limits, the larger the group that is threatened, the greater the aggregate
disutility, even if each person in the group has a small chance of becoming a victim. One who threatens a group usually creates more anxiety and
likely stimulates more total precaution-taking than does one who threatens a specific person. For example, someone who threatens a shooting on
a vaguely specified college campus may create sufficient anxiety to shut
down a campus for a day. The anxiety and shutdown costs are great, even
if no individual feels particularly threatened." The requirement of reasonable apprehension seems sensible enough, but there is no reason to
23.

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (explaining that the state can only punish

threatening expression when the speaker "means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals").
24. Put differently, if intent is important in criminal law, perhaps because it helps show that an
injury was not accidental, then in turn an earlier, specific threat clarifies intent. Law and economics
struggles with the intent requirement and often avoids the treatment of threats. See, e.g., Richard A.

Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 1193, 1214-19, 1221-22 (1985)
(rationalizing the treatment of attempts, struggling with intent, and avoiding threats).
25. See, e.g., Jon Seidel, University of Chicago Cancels Classes After FBI Warns of Gun Threat,
CHI. SUN TIMES (Nov. 29, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/university-of-chicagocancels-classes-after-fbi-warns-of-gun-threat.
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expect that apprehension is more reasonable as the threat is addressed to
a specific individual. In any event, not all general threats get a free pass.
Law can and does criminalize group threats in piecemeal fashion. If, for
example, there is a spate of school shootings, a legislature might make it
a crime to threaten the use of a weapon or to bring a weapon onto school
grounds. 26 Schoolchildren and their parents might have reason to grow
anxious about threats made against an entire school, but the legislature
can respond to their apprehensions about such a general threat, without
directly removing the requirement of a specific threat from the law of
threats. 27

The distinction between general and specific threats, and the inclination to leave many of the former unsanctioned, may reflect an intuition
about marginal deterrence. Marginal deterrence theory offers a means of
drawing or understanding the line between specific and general threats
that does not require any judgment about the value of one kind of speech
or another, and that does not underestimate the harm imposed by a general threat.
B.

Specific Threats and Marginal Deterrence Theory

The offender who points a gun at a pedestrian and says, "Your wallet or your life," presents law with the archetypal question of how much
punishment to attach to the threat and then how much to leave for a
completed crime, in this case a shooting. An important assumption here
is that there is some ceiling to the penalty, or binding constraint on enforcement, so that the punishment for the threat cannot simply be x, for
the shooting y, and for both x+y, as there would then be no reduction in
marginal deterrence as x is increased?2 Assume for the moment that law
26.

Without such a statute, the remedies are limited. See, e.g., Bolden v. Chartiers Valley Sch.

Dist., 869 A.2d 1134, 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (finding that employee's bringing loaded gun onto
school property constituted neglect of duty, and the lying and hindering a lawful investigation initiated
by the superintendent gave the district authority to take disciplinary action against employee).
27. As law criminalizes various general threats, albeit by assigning these threats to new categories like weapons violations or online crimes, the distinction between specific and general threats be-

comes formalistic. On the other hand, these legislative moves against various general threats mirror or
confirm an analogy between general and specific threats, on the one hand, and tort actions and public
nuisance, on the other. In the tort context, individual plaintiffs have standing to complain of a private
nuisance, as in the case of a polluting factory next door, but where a public, larger-scale, nuisance is
concerned-though it might be more harmful-the resolution of conflicting uses is left to the legislature. See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions,
18 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 43, 43-44 (2010) (discussing tradeoff between public and private enforcement). One rationale is that individual plaintiffs might have the wrong incentives when it comes to
bringing or settling such claims. Similarly, in the criminal law, the more general the threat, the more it
is poorly assessed by an individual or by a jury's assessment of the reasonableness of various individuals' fears. In turn, these are often settings where the legal system expects police or other authorities to
keep the peace, dissipate any significant threats, and then proceed with a specialized criminal statute
aimed at reckless endangerment, weapons violations, terrorism, or other categories that serve to circumvent the specificity requirement of the statute addressing criminal threats.
28. We assume away the likelihood of decreasing marginal disutility of punishment. In other
words, y might provide more marginal deterrence when it is unattached to x because the offender fears
the first units of punishment much more than later ones. We set this aside not only because potential
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can solve this problem by simply reaching a reasonable balance between
the threat and the completed shooting. It attaches a more modest punishment to the criminal threat, than that suggested by the proportionality
principle alone, to leave space for a large enough marginal deterrent on
the (threatened) shooting. Marginal deterrence theory is easily incorporated into law, and there is certainly no reason to assume that it is ignored by lawmakers. It is easy to imagine, for example, that the armed
robber who threatens a pedestrian with his words and a drawn weapon
can expect a three-year prison term if apprehended and convicted; a fiveyear sentence if he also steals the victim's wallet and runs off; a ten-year
term if he shoots and maims the victim; and a thirty-year term if he kills
the victim. Other steps, and associated numbers, can be inserted all the
way up.
To be sure, a marginal deterrence theorist might say that three
(years) is too big a number for the first of these wrongs because more
(than two additional years') deterrence should have been reserved to discourage the taking of the wallet; but any such argument about the increments is empirical, difficult to resolve in the face of heterogeneous crimi29
nals who can change behavior over time, and perhaps wrong. The
discussion here assumes, optimistically and for the sake of exposition,
that the numbers provided by existing law already reflect careful thinking
about marginal deterrence.
Consider now the case of a general threat. Suppose an offender says
to a group of partygoers: "Quiet down, or I am going to come back and
make you sorry." A useful and novel way to think about why this general
threat is not criminalized is that, first, the general threat need not cause
anxiety or any harm on its own, and therefore deterring the threat as
such is not so important, and second, because the details of any subsequent step are unknown and addressed to many people, law reserves its
deterrents. The threatener has not said what he will do next, or to whom,
and he has by assumption caused no physical or personal injury by the
time he is detained. He may have become sober and calm, or he may
have returned to find that the partygoers dispersed because of his threat,
called the police, or readied themselves for his violent return. In the absence of good information about these later steps, it is perhaps clever to
attach no penalty to the first step, the initial broad threat, to reserve deterrence for the subsequent steps, including attempted crimes. In this
way, the distinction between specific and general threats can be understood through marginal deterrence theory. 0
offenders are likely to be heterogeneous, but also because the shape of the disutility function matters
little to our argument.
29. At the risk of repetition, see Friedman & Sjostrom, supra note 3, for special cases and assumptions where the marginal deterrence (quick) intuition is called into question.
30. It is tempting to add in the idea that this threatener of noisy partygoers is not credible, so
that he imposes little anxiety and is, in fact, unlikely to pose much of a risk. One reason to doubt credibility is that the threatener has announced his plan, though not with specificity, and he can expect that
defensive measures will be in place when he returns. But this is even more so if the threat is specific, as
in, "Quiet down or I will return in two hours and kill the bartender." A specific threat of this kind is
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MarginalDeterrenceFollowed by a Substitution Effect

How should theory influence the structure of criminal penalties?
Assume that a starting point in the design of criminal law and penalties is
the proportionality principle: the more severe the crime, the greater the
penalty.3 1 Assessments of severity might derive from straightforward deterrence calculations, retribution considerations, incarceration costs, or
political pressures. This design principle yields a baseline, or schedule, of
crimes and penalties. Imagine that along this schedule, theft from a person is assigned a penalty of one-year imprisonment; armed robbery, perhaps included in the category of aggravated assault, is assigned ten years;
and armed robbery that includes a shooting in which someone is injured,
sometimes known as aggravated battery, draws a penalty of twenty
years.32 For quick reference, we might summarize this part of the schedule as TH-1/AA-1O/AB-20, where AB-20, for example, means that aggravated battery is associated with a twenty-year penalty. 33
Marginal deterrence theory suggests that the legislature think carefully about the differential, or gap, between two crimes, wherever the offender is likely to be in a position to escalate from one crime to another.
It might suggest that if the proportionality principle alone produces a
ten-year gap between the two serious felonies on this schedule, it would
be advisable to widen the gap in order to discourage the criminal from
shooting his victim, as he might be tempted to do in order to gain property or eliminate a witness so as to escape apprehension. The legislature
can do this by increasing the penalty on the more serious crime, producing a schedule.such as TH-1/AA-10/AB-25, but this strategy quickly runs
more likely to trigger defensive measures and, in turn, execution seems less likely if the offender is
rational. If the threatener warns the partygoers, "Get quiet right now or I will make you all sorry," the
threat is incredible either because the threatener is outnumbered or because if he threatens to return
with a weapon, there is time to mount a defense or call the police.
31.

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

181 (1789) ("The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is the expense, which it may be worth
while to be at, in the way of punishment."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 25874 (9th ed. 2014) (discussing the elements of an efficient criminal law and noting that much follows
from the infeasibility of setting punishments high enough to achieve 100% deterrence).
32. The penalties are usually given in the form of ranges, so that aggravated battery with a firearm in Illinois, for instance, is a Class X felony, assigned six to thirty years. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/124.2(a)(1)-b) (2017). The same is true for theft, with penalties usually rising according to the value taken as well as whether the theft was from another person (as opposed to a store shelf, for example). In
Illinois, the range is from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony, and could generate a fine or a
prison term. The mean penalty is probably between one and two years if the theft is from a person. Id.
§ 5/16-1(b)(1). The crimes and penalties used in the text are thus illustrative and show what the schedule would look like before further consideration of marginal deterrence, substitution, and the credibility effect described presently.
33. TH refers, of course, to theft from a person, and AA to aggravated assault, here the armed
robbery with no discharge of the weapon. For simplicity, the example continues to assume that aggravated battery produces a sanction that is not added to the sanction for the aggravated assault, which
will usually precede the battery. In Section II.B the two sanctions were not summed because of the
ceiling on the system's ability to penalize. There is also a doctrinal reason for not summing the sanctions; the criminal charge of aggravated battery will include the lesser charge of aggravated assault,
and in most jurisdictions there will be circumstances in which one or the other must therefore be chosen. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fallof Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351,

354 (2005).
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into a ceiling. The ceiling has at least two sources. First, the criminal does
not expect an infinitely long life, so a stretched out schedule like TH1/AA-35/AB-95 is unlikely to produce greater marginal deterrence than
does TH-1/AA-35/AB-50. Moreover, lawmakers will have prison conditions and prison construction costs in mind, so that widening the gap by
pushing higher (and then pushing the penalty for maiming three witnesses yet higher) is a strategy with limits. The alternative is to widen the gap
by lowering the penalty for the less severe crime. The analysis is not
weakened by an assumption that the ceiling has been reached at AB-25,
with thirty years reserved for murder perhaps, so that the way to further
deter the armed robber from shooting is to lower the penalty for armed
robbery alone. Perhaps TH-1/AA-10/AB-25 becomes TH-1/AA-5/AB25, so that there is a significant deterrent to pulling the trigger, even if we
are constrained by a ceiling and hold constant the probability of apprehension. 4 In some cases, this large gap is politically, or even morally, impossible. If the middle crime is especially heinous, as in the case of rape,
marginal deterrence may simply be sacrificed in the interest of proportionality. Where armed robbery is concerned, however, the 1/5/25 schedule may be acceptable.
Note that the gap between theft and armed robbery narrows as the
gap between armed robbery and aggravated battery increases," and a
thoughtful legislator might fear that thieves, as mundane as pickpockets,
36
will now arm themselves and sometimes do great harm. Given the ceiling, no gap can be widened without narrowing another. Fortunately, it is
unlikely that offenders will easily substitute from pickpocketing or other
thievery to armed robbery. They certainly will not do so on the spot. If
marginal deterrence is about influencing an offender in the midst of a
crime, the TH/AA gap is obviously less important than the AA/AB gap.
Moreover, many pickpockets are experts in their trade and would not
readily shift to armed robbery; other amateur thieves have no ready ac-

34. Most of the examples in the text assume a constant rate of apprehension. In reality, the gap
between penalties usually understates marginal deterrence because the offender knows that the more
serious crime will attract more police investigation. On the other hand, a more violent offender may
scare away or even eliminate witnesses.
35. The punishment for theft depends on the value taken and whether T is a repeat offender. 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1(b). There are many different grades that increase the penalty. For example, if
T steals property valued less than $10,000, it is a Class 3 felony punishable by two to five years imprisonment and a fine up to $25,000.
Robbery, however, is a Class 2 felony punishable by three to seven years. Id. § 5/18-1(c). The crime
rises to Aggravated Robbery if T threatens with a weapon (even if he is lying about that fact), a Class
1 felony (four to fifteen years). Id.
The punishment for Armed Robbery depends on whether the criminal is armed with a dangerous
weapon (Class X, six to thirty years), a gun (six to thirty years + fifteen years), discharges a firearm
(six to thirty years + twenty years), or shoots the victim (six to thirty years + twinty-five years). Id.
§ 5/18-2(b).
36. The argument works best if these offenders underestimate the harm they will do with weapons.
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cess to firearms. The most serious design problem is where a narrow gap
might induce substitution toward more serious wrongdoing."
The legislature's major problem is that this substitution effect contradicts the influence of marginal deterrence theory. If the schedule is adjusted to TH-1/AA-5/AB-25, there is the danger that armed robbery will
become newly attractive to offenders. It may well cause a few criminals
who are inclined to shoot to do less of that but then to commit many
more armed robberies, as most of them plan to leave their nonsubmitting victims unharmed. More important, criminal activity may increase because armed robbery (sans shooting) is now underdeterred. Its
ideal penalty of ten was decreased to five to widen the AA/AB gap and
discourage shootings; but this move in support of marginal deterrence
leaves an insufficient deterrent for the less serious of the two crimes, and
there will be substitution in its favor. The first two dimensions of criminal
deterrence are thus at odds with one another.
The important lesson here is that law needs to focus on substitution
as well as escalation. It may, for example, be sensible to increase the
penalties for both theft and armed robbery because criminals previously
inclined to rob and shoot may now be likely to commit a few more armed
robberies-in the course of which they are less inclined to shoot-but
also to find mere theft, or even pickpocketing, more attractive.' In addition, other offenders may migrate to armed robbery because its penalty
has been decreased. Taking these effects into account, the new schedule
should perhaps be TH-2/AA-8/AB-25. Some of the marginal deterrence
is sacrificed in order to make armed robbery ("AR"), and even theft, less
attractive, but there is no reason to expect that the optimal schedule is a
return to TH-1/AA-10/AB-25. In fact, the typical schedule of penalties
dramatically widens the gap to discourage the use of a firearm, leaving
fewer years to discourage the deployment of the firearm.39 This is probably well-intentioned, but mistaken. There ought to be experimentation
with a wider gap between the two serious crimes.
In some settings, there is probably no substitution of any kind."
Consider a plagiarist in a university community. If the penalty for a stu37. See generally Friedman & Sjostrom, supra note 3 (considering the two-crime cases as well as
substitutions among more options).
38. Imagine that armed robberies, like most opportunities, are available to a given offender with
a declining marginal productivity. The offender expects to gain 100 from the first, 95 from the second,
and so forth, and has chosen to commit x armed robberies. The expected marginal product includes
the risk of apprehension and the penalty for the crime. If law now increases the AA/AB gap, by raising
the penalty for aggravated battery, then on the margin the offender will shoot less often and perhaps
be prepared to commit more aggravated assaults without escalating to battery in the event that the
victim does not submit. But the marginal productivity of armed robberies will fall, and mere thievery
may also become an attractive option, as it is now the offender's best or second-best line of work, inasmuch as armed robbery-with some probability of aggravated battery--is now less profitable.
39. While using a gun greatly increases the penalty for armed robbery (six to thirty years + fifteen years), only five years is added for discharging the firearm and another five years for actually

maiming or killing the victim. 720 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/18-2(b).
40. Marginal deterrence is more straightforward where promises, rather than threats, are concerned, because substitution is unlikely. Thus, if a party to a contract hints at a coming breach, or
breaches in a minor way in order to secure some benefit at the other party's expense, the law might or
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dent's plagiarism were severe, it would be unlikely that plagiarists would
think they had little to lose by stepping up to transcript forgery or the
theft of rare books from the university library. The wrongdoing in question is fairly self-contained if only because the skill required for plagiarism does not help with the more serious crimes. Plagiarism may be like
pickpocketing in this regard. Similarly, if the gap between sexual harassment and sexual assault on campus is increased by reducing the penalty
for the former to improve marginal deterrence with respect to assault, it
is improbable that plagiarists would switch to sexual harassment. If, however, there is a risk of increased sexual harassment because previously
well-behaved students will now become harassers given the low penalty
attached to that wrong, then it is risky to widen the gap between harassment and assault by lowering the penalty attached to the former.41
The offender who waves a gun while demanding a wallet can easily
escalate to violence and aggravated battery; but because there is easy
substitution back down towards mere threats and theft, reducing the
penalties for, or even decriminalizing, threats may seem pointless. Reform in the direction of decriminalization may increase marginal deterrence for the more serious and violent crime, but people will gravitate
toward threat-making if they believe they can often enough get what they
want simply by threatening. But there is more to the problem than this
tradeoff in two dimensions. In the next Section we introduce a third dimension and explain why a low sanction makes threats less credible because of the improved marginal deterrence; counterintuitively, these
threats become less attractive to the offender. By lowering or even eliminating the sanction attached to threats, law can increase marginal deterrence without risking much substitution to the lower-level wrong of
threat-making.
D.
1.

The Credibility Effect

Primary Credibility

If a rational or experienced criminal is often influenced by the gaps
between penalties for crimes of different severities, then it is quite likely
that he is also affected by his perception of his victim's regard for various
threats.42 If V finds a threat especially credible because V knows that T
faces very little additional punishment by executing the threat T has visited upon V, then T will be more likely to make such a threat in the first
place.43 Correspondingly, when V finds a threat much less credible, bemight not provide a remedy. If it does provide a remedy, then it deters the minor breach and threat,
and it leaves less of a remedy to secure the larger project. But it is unlikely that a smaller penalty for
the first breach changes the level of contractual activity.
41. And of course a better approach might be to widen the gap by increasing the penalty for assault, unless that is precluded by a ceiling formed by the university's capacity to punish without criminal law's protections and the involvement of the state.
42. Cf supra Section II.B.
43. Cf supra Sections IIA-B.
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cause V knows that if T executes T faces a much greater punishment than
if T does not, V will often refuse to submit." In turn, because V will submit less often, T will be less likely to issue the threat in the first placeunless, of course, the penalty for the threat alone is so slight that T loses
little by testing V. This is the heart of the primary credibility effect. 45
Even where offenders can move fluidly from a threat to its execution, as they often can between aggravated assault and aggravated battery, the wider gap suggested by marginal deterrence theory has a powerful impact on the credibility of the threat-and this in turn decreases the
amount of substitution to the threat. Note that the primary credibility effect is the third element to be considered in scheduling sanctions, but it is
relevant only where one wrong amounts to a threat of completing a more
serious wrong. The dimension of direct deterrence, reflected in the potential substitution of crimes with lesser penalties, never disappears because there will always be offenders who try to extract something from
victims if they can threaten these victims at low cost. Even where the
credibility of such threats is very low, some sanction is sensible, both because the threats impose anxiety and because some victims will submit.
Still, the primary credibility effect should encourage law to attach low
sanctions to threats. Doing so will create a larger gap and more marginal
deterrence with respect to the more serious wrong of execution and, at
the same time, will likely reduce threat-making. The idea is that there will
be little substitution towards threats because the increased marginal deterrence reduces their credibility and profitability.
Both marginal deterrence and the primary credibility effect are a
function of the gap between the expected punishment for the threat and
the punishment for the more serious crime, but they are hardly the same
thing. Marginal deterrence is about the offender's incentive to escalate
from one wrong to another, as from AA to AB in our schedule. It is
about T's calculation of the net cost of executing his threat, once he has
issued the threat. In contrast, the primary credibility effect concerns T's
incentive to issue the threat in the first place. It is derived from the probability of extracting a gain from V at either the first (threat) or second
(violence) step, and thus from T's view of V's perception of the credibility of the threat. The primary credibility effect comes out of a dynamic
analysis of threats. Marginal deterrence looks only to T's incentives and
regards V as a passive player in the interaction. The substitution effect is
somewhat dynamic in that it looks not only at T's responses to the
schedule of punishments but also to other potential offenders' inclinations to engage in criminal activity. The primary credibility effect is yet
more dynamic because it adds in the victim's perspective in the form of
44.

Cf. supra Sections IIA-B.

45. It might be called the Incredibility Effect, because the idea is to use law and marginal deterrence to make offenders' threats less credible, but following convention we call it the credibility effect,
as it is about credibility. The first (and only one, to the best of our knowledge) to point to what we call
the credibility effect is Uri Weiss, The Robber Wants to be Punished (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem,
Federman Ctr. for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper No. 685, 2015).
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V's inclination to submit given the credibility of T's threat; moreover, it
follows through by examining T's incentive to engage in threat-making in
the first place, given V's likely response. For this reason, the primary
credibility effect can be described as offering an ex ante perspective,
while marginal deterrence operates not quite ex post, but ex medioafter the threat but before execution."
The primary credibility effect can be understood as resolving the
tension between marginal deterrence and the substitution effect. The
former suggested a large AA/AB gap, for example, while the latter pushes in the other direction because offenders will substitute toward the
lower-sanctioned wrong, AA. How do we know there is a net gain from
increasing the gap? The primary credibility effect assures that the large
gap is a good thing; by raising the cost of execution, it devalues the
threat, or AA, itself. In the end, there will be little substitution towards
something that is unlikely to bring about submission.
2.

Secondary Credibility

As we explained in Part II, a threat is credible if the victim believes
escalation to be likely in the event of nonsubmission. But it is secondarily
credible the more V trusts T not to renew or execute the threat following
V's submission. T wants V to believe that the threat is both primarily and
secondarily credible, but low execution costs normally raise the probability of the first effect while lowering the likelihood of the second effect;
low execution costs lead V to fear that submission will be followed by
execution or another threat. If V submits, it is because V reasons that,
once T obtains his property, T gains little from continuing violently.
Properly calibrated penalties can decrease both primary and secondary credibility and make threats even less valuable. We have already
shown that law can decrease primary credibility by lowering the sanction
for threats and increasing the gap between the sanctions for a threat and
its execution. This may well be enough for most legislatures, but it is possible that law can do yet better by also decreasing secondary credibility.
The counter-intuitive, and admittedly risky, strategy is to make the sanction for execution (or renewal of the threat) following submission lowperhaps even very low. If the sanction for post-submission execution (or
46. Imagine, almost as in Part II, that the sanction for a threat is eight, or alternatively one, and
that the sanction attached to execution of the threat is twenty. Marginal deterrence is of course greater
with the sanction of one for the threat. The gap between threat and execution is nineteen, or alternatively twelve. An offender who conveys a threat is presumably less likely to follow through and execute when the gap is greater. In contrast, the credibility effect focuses on the notion that the victim is
less likely to submit when the sanction for the threat is one, and the offender is more likely deterred.
This makes threat-making a less attractive activity to offenders, and there may actually be fewer
threats because the sanction of one is perceived as costly given the fact that threats will rarely succeed.
Meanwhile, if the sanction for the threat were eight, victims might be expected to submit with regularity because they know that unsatisfied threateners do not lose terribly much by proceeding with execution. If so, there will be more substitution to threats when there is a higher sanction attached to it.
Counterintuitively, the 8/20 schedule might attract more criminals than the 1/20 schedule, and this is
especially so if nineteen deters the greater wrong and twelve is inadequate for this task.
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threat renewal) is low, secondary credibility will be low. V will know that
submission is especially unwise because execution or renewal of the
threat might well follow. In turn, T will see that V's submission is even
less likely. The proposed legal strategy is unusual, to say the least. Ideally, threats will be reduced because the high AA/AB gap makes the threat
incredible inasmuch as execution costs are high so long as there is a significant probability of T's apprehension. But if T threatens anyway, and
V contemplates submission, the idea is to show V that submission might
not satisfy T. If V is often convinced and does not submit, then in turn T
will find threats even less profitable. In short, a wide AAJAB gap should
convince V that T would not execute (as primary credibility is low). But
when V nevertheless submits, it might be clever for the sanction for escalation to be low in order to weaken T's secondary credibility. The idea,
again, is for T to see that V is unlikely to submit in the first place.
The potential for this unusual deterrence strategy is most apparent
in a case like blackmail, where the victim has time to consider whether or
not to submit to the wrongdoer's threat. V must fear that if she submits
and pays T, T will simply repeat the threat. Imagine now that law penalizes blackmail but provides no penalty whatsoever for repeated blackmail. V will know that T loses nothing by repeating his threat (setting
aside some increased chance of apprehension) and, in turn, V might now
choose not to submit in the first round because the risk of repeated
blackmail, with no end to required payments, convinces V to stand up to
T in the first place. It is even possible that law could provide a substantial
penalty for one-time blackmail, but provide that if a victim submits, then
the victim is guilty of a crime or, more palatably, that the blackmailer is
completely free of criminal liability once the victim submits to his threat.
Again, the idea is to discourage submission by V so that blackmailers will
find their craft unprofitable.
When a victim is in terrible fear and must act quickly, it is unlikely
that a strategy aimed at reducing secondary credibility will work and, in
any event, it is probably too fraught for legislative experimentation. Consider the rapist who threatens to maim or kill V if she does not submit.
Law might focus virtually all of its deterrence at step one, so that aggravated criminal sexual assault is associated with a penalty of twenty-eight
years, increased to twenty-nine in a case where a weapon is discharged or
the victim is beaten, and then thirty (the presumed ceiling) for rapemurder. Current law more closely resembles a 10/20/30 schedule, which
aims to deter escalation by the rapist---but at the expense of some low
deterrence at the first step. In theory, an advantage of the 28/29/30
schedule is that it makes the threatener's implicit promise not to further
injure the victim less plausible because the rapist does not face a significantly greater penalty in the event of escalation. But the implication is
that law wants to encourage the victim to resist. And, even if it were
somehow true that broad resistance would decrease the incidence of
rape, the cost is too great to contemplate, and the likelihood that victims
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can engage in cool calculations while being assaulted is low. Law might
just as well tell the victims of a hijacked plane that they and their families
will be unable to collect any damages unless they battle the hijacker to
the death. It is possible that this sort of schedule of penalties for hijacking (15/25--but then zero in the event of submission) would discourage
hijackers, but it would do so by sacrificing the lives of some victims. Such
strategies seem more appropriate for trained military units than for civilians.
Returning to the earlier example of assaults aimed at gaining property, law can weaken T's secondary credibility by promising very little
additional punishment to the criminal who uses violence following a victim's submission to an aggravated assault. If we imagine V to be a storekeeper, then it is plausible that V has thought about armed robbery in
advance and, if V knows that law provides only a small gap between aggravated assault that ends in a property transfer ("AATH") and aggravated battery ("AB"), V may decide not to submit to an armed robber's
threat. A narrow AATH/AB gap encourages V to disbelieve T's threat.
In turn, an experienced T may be less likely to threaten in the first place.
The legal strategy reflected in the narrow gap is risky because T might be
tempted to escalate his crime at low cost to lower the risk of apprehension. If so, high marginal deterrence at the point of violence remains important. But it is plausible that the better goal is to reduce threats in the
first place because these are the offender's high-profit crimes. If so, the
strategy of diminishing T's secondary credibility by narrowing the
AATH/AB gap is inviting.47 On the other hand, if the most important
thing is to deter violence, then the AATHIAB gap must be large.
E.

Summary

Return now to our illustration where marginal deterrence considerations altered the initial schedule based on proportionality, and all that it
might reflect, from TH-1/AA-10/AB-20 to TH-1/AA-5/AB-25. The substitution effect then modified this result to TH-2/AA-8/AB-25.4 The
primary credibility effect could surely nudge this back to TH-2/AA6/AB-25, but a more interesting-if rather extreme--possibility is TH2/AA-3/AB-25. Marginal deterrence matters where the second gap is
concerned and, given the ceiling of twenty-five years for anything short
of murder, deterrence is maximized if the penalty for AA, in this case
47.

The legislature can decide separately whether the narrow gap should be at the low end, as

with TH-2/AATH-4/AB-5, or at the high end, with TH-2/AATH-24/AB-25.
48. As conceded in the discussion supra Section II.B, it is possible that the marginal deterrence
and substitution elements are perfectly offsetting, in which case AA-10/AB-25 is as good a guess as
any for the optimal schedule. Recall that AB-20 increased to AB-25 to reflect marginal deterrence and
the likely ceiling on penalties. TH-1 was modified to TH-2 in response to the substitution effect. The
assumption of virtually no substitution between theft, or at least pickpocketing, and armed robbery
means that the narrowing of the gap between TH and AA presents no danger. Finally, pickpocketing
is not itself a threat of armed robbery or worse in the way that armed robbery is a threat of a shooting,
so the credibility effect does not come into play; and TH-2 remains even as the AA/AB gap is adjusted
to take account of the credibility effect.

No. 4]

THREATS AND CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

1355

armed robbery with no shooting, is about the same as that for theft without a weapon or threat. 49 The idea is to think beyond marginal deterrence
to the danger of substitution to armed robbery. The driving force is primary credibility and the incorporation of the victim's perspective. The
greater the AA/AB gap, the less credible is T's threat is because T is well
deterred from executing on his threat-and the less attractive it will be
for T, or any other offenders, to ply this threat. In turn, where it is most
plausible that V and T have time to consider one another's incentives
and responses, secondary credibility becomes more important, and a
small sanction for execution after submission (or for rethreatening) is
justified or, at least, deserves experimentation.
In reality, it is convenient to attach some extra penalty to a threat
like AA, regardless of whether escalation follows. One reason is that if
there is no marginal sanction at all, there will be too much opportunistic
substitution, as offenders will simply have nothing to lose by threatening
victims and hoping that some submit despite the incredible threats. Second, there is the political reality that victims will demand some punishment for their offenders. A third reason for having some sanction stems
from the practicalities of law enforcement. A criminal who is apprehended in the course of an aggravated battery will insist that as long as his
crime was not completed he should not be punished-and especially so if
he did not even take the victim's property. There is too fine a line between armed robbery and "armed robbery with an attempted shooting"
to rely upon. t Moreover, it would be costly and unacceptable to encourage police to delay apprehending repeat criminals in order to give the latter a chance to maim their victims so that they can be put away for twenty-five years.

49. A more complete analysis should take both submission and nonsubmission into account.
When T threatens with AA, there are several possibilities: (1) V does not submit, in which case T ei-

ther (la) withdraws (a sequence we might call AAW) or (lb) escalates to AB. A large AA/AB gap is
desirable to encourage (la) rather than (lb); (2) V does submit, in which case T succeeds in gaining
V's property (reflected in the sequence AATH), and then T either (2a) departs or (2b) proves secondarily unreliable and actually executes anyway (or repeats the threat). In this case, as discussed in the

text, a large gap with respect to AATH/AB is good for discouraging (2b), but a small gap might be a
remarkable way of defeating secondary credibility, and discouraging the threat, AA, in the first place.
For example, if V submits, a schedule of AATH-4/AB-25 works to deter violence, while AATH-4/AB5 discourages submission in the first place by sacrificing marginal deterrence. This is the critical choice
for the legislature. The more it wants to influence V to join in crime fighting, the more a small gap
might be used to reduce T's secondary credibility and thus encourage V's resistance. It is plausible that
this choice depends on the legislature's choices regarding gun control. In a state where lawmakers believe they are fighting crime by allowing or encouraging storekeepers to arm themselves, the law presumably wants the storekeeper to resist in the THIAA/AB scenario. It is even plausible that the structure of criminal sanctions should depend on whether the victim is armed.
50. Put differently, assault is normally thought of as attempted battery. At the same time, law
often punishes attempts in order to have a remedy in place when a criminal is apprehended just before
completing his intended crime. It is this function of the law of attempts that is unintentionally sacrificed when threats are completely decriminalized. One solution is to lower the penalty for threats, but
not to go too far; in the text's example, TH-2/AA-6/AB-25 represents this position. Another is to classify threats, or aggravated assaults (with no battery), as the lowest class of felony or as a misdemeanors. AA-3 represents this solution.
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The point of this Article is obviously not to draft a detailed criminal
code but, for illustrative purposes, it is useful to settle on TH-2/AA3/AB-25 as the schedule indicated by the combination of the proportionality principle, marginal deterrence, the substitution effect and, finally,
the primary credibility effect. The penalty of three gives police a tool for
apprehending a criminal just before a shooting, when there is a good
chance that a threat has been issued. The low, but non-zero, sanction reflects the arguments and realities just described. And when secondary
credibility seems relevant, law can experiment with a small sanction for
escalation following submission.
IV. REVERSING THE CREDIBILITY EFFECT BY SINKING COSTS
A.

The Sunk Cost Strategy

Marginal deterrence theory points to the danger of law's attaching a
significant penalty to behavior that leads up to a serious crime.' In the
case of a threat and the danger of its subsequent execution, the credibility effect is itself a function of marginal deterrence. It diminishes the value of threats to offenders. One way to think about the ex ante and ex medio perspectives is to describe the penalty that law attaches to a threat as
a sunk cost. Once T brings on this sunk cost by threatening V, the sunk
cost is irrelevant for marginal decision-making, and what matters is the
expected penalty for escalation. The argument for lowering the sanction
attached to threats is thus a way of undoing T's ability to sink costs and
using the available deterrent to discourage execution and, in turn, make
T's threat less credible in the first place.52
The sunk-cost perspective suggests that, even when all legal penalties are reserved for the final step, or law is simply out of the picture, T
can enhance credibility by sinking execution costs.53 Remarkably, this can
51. Shavell, supra note 2, at 345.
52. For an example that includes execution costs in addition to expected legal penalties, imagine
that T threatens to harm V unless the latter transfers property worth nine. Suppose further that the
expected cost to T, in the form of a legal penalty, is ten for the crime he threatens to execute, and four
simply for threatening the crime. Apart from these legal penalties, T's costs are very low, perhaps one
for cornering V and issuing the threat and then another two for executing it. T will gain the property
worth nine either by coerced transfer or by taking it after he harms V. Criminal activity of this sort is
highly profitable in the absence of law. T threatens V, spending one to gain nine, and V finds the
threat credible. Even when "forced" to execute, T spends another two, and a total of three, to gain
nine. But once law imposes penalties of four for a threat and ten for the (threat plus) completed crime,
and often apprehends criminals, the criminal activity is unprofitable unless the victim often submits to
the threat alone. At the point of threat, the marginal penalty for execution is ten minus four, or six,
and when added to the execution cost of two, it pays for T to proceed in order to gain nine. If the
threat alone is not penalized, and the entire ten is still attached to the completed crime, then T faces a
cost of ten plus two, and crime does not pay. When it penalizes threats, law thus creates sunk costs and
makes the completed crimeand thus the threat-more credible.
53. For an insightful analysis in one specific setting, see Lucian Arye Bebehuk, A New Theory
Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1996) (suggesting
that negative-value suits exist because the defendant knows that the plaintiff can proceed in stages,
spending some resources in the first stage, and credibly threatening to spend more in the next, so that
the suit can be credible even without actual expenditures). Note that Bebehuk assumes that the parties

No. 4]

THREATS AND CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

1357

be so even where it would seem that no credible threat is possible. The
offender can sink costs, or stage the process of criminal wrongdoing, until
it becomes credible that he will complete the crime. It is conceivable that
V will foresee T's staging strategy and decide to submit even before T
does much sinking of costs. This staging by T essentially reverses the
credibility effect. Section III.D developed the idea that greater marginal
deterrence for execution makes the earlier threat less credible, so that
offenders are less attracted to threat-making because victims are less
likely to be submissive. Here, the idea is that T can do the reverse; T engages in a kind of "homemade credibility effect," sinking costs in order to
reduce the marginal cost of execution. This will enhance credibility
(viewed from V's perspective), and make submission by V more likely. T
will, in this way, increase the profitability of his threat.'
cannot affect the total costs of litigation or the expected value of the suit. The parties are also assumed
to be capable of settling at any stage. We assume that settlement is not an option but instead that the
threatener either gains all or gains nothing.
54. For an application of the idea advanced here about multi-staging to settlements, including a
discussion of dividing surpluses, see William H. J. Hubbard, The Fourfold Credibility Problem in Law
and War (2016) (unpublished manuscript). Although Bebchuk and Hubbard both picture the plaintiff
as proceeding in stages, in much of civil litigation, sunk costs are not often in plaintiffs' control because
discovery is usually more burdensome for defendants. Bebehuk, supra note 53, at 4; Hubbard, see supra.
Sunk costs and credibility are familiar concepts in warfare. Imagine a Country, T, that threatens to
invade its neighbor, V, unless the latter cedes control of disputed territory. V finds the threat incredible because it knows that the cost of invasion to T is greater than the value of the territory at stake.
Imagine that costs and benefits are similarly assessed by the parties, the territory in dispute is worth
100 to each, invasion costs 120 to T and would impose direct costs of 50 on V, and the invasion would
be successful from T's perspective because it would control the territory in question and thus transfer
100 from V to itself. Finally, neither country gains anything when the other incurs costs. At the outset,
T's invasion threat is not credible because it must spend 120 to gain 100. It tries to bluff because V's
costs amount to 150 (the 50 from invasion plus the loss of the territory), but V can see that from T's
perspective the invasion is too expensive. But imagine further that the 120 cost to T is the sum of 30
for mobilizing troops, another 30 for amassing equipment at the border once the troops are in place,
and then 60 for the expected loss of life and equipment in an actual invasion. T might now proceed
with mobilization. Following this first step, V will perceive that T need only spend 90 more to gain 100.
Once T sinks costs, the threat becomes credible. If V rationally capitulates after T mobilizes, T will
have spent 30 to gain 100.
Virtually every threat can be divided into stages, so this strategy for making a threat "appear" credible is of significance. As long as T is able to divide execution costs into stages that each costs less than
the benefit to T from execution, V will capitulate. V can win only if (contrary to the illustration set out
here) it can raise the cost to T of the final stage, as by defeating T's invading army. If not, V will comply in an earlier stage, perhaps even saving T the need to incur any costs at all, if each stage imposes
costs on V and T's costs are of no benefit to V. Powerful bullies operate in such environments, the argument goes, and only rarely need to carry out their threats. The stronger party's threats are always
credible, and something like concerted or principled reactions are required to thwart the skilled bully.
Finally, in some situations V can engage in symmetrical and offsetting staging. In the warfare example, V can influence credibility by taking steps that make capitulation impossible or at least less valuable to T. If V salts the earth, the disputed territory will be of lower value to T (as well as to V), and T's
threat is made less credible. Working backward, T will not threaten because it perceives V's optimal
strategy. Indeed, there should be no threats but only surprise invasions; the same is true for crimes,
where V can destroy the value of what T seeks to acquire. In reality, and depending on technologies, V
chooses a mix of precautions, including expenditures and sacrifices, to make it a less attractive target.
The former can lead to an arms race, while the latter is analogous to a scorched-earth strategy. In turn,
T can often increase the expected gains from execution in order to enhance credibility. T might, for
example, build good highways up to the present border, thereby increasing the expected benefit of
invasion. But, for many victims of crime, it will be impossible to anticipate threats and to undertake
countermeasures.
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CriminalDeterrenceand Sunk Costs

In the context of criminal law, sunk costs derive from law's penalties
more than they do from any direct expenditures by T. If the law contains
a TH-2/AA-3/AB-25 schedule, then the threat made by an armed robber
will not always be believed because V knows that the sanction T faces for
execution is twenty-two. T, however, can reverse the credibility effect by
sinking costs through strategic escalation. Thus, an armed robber might
strike or pistol-whip V not only to frighten V into submission, but also to
go beyond the lightly sanctioned category of aggravated assault, which is
the threat staged in this case, to make his threat a battery. T would prefer
not to shoot V because that risks raising the expected penalty yet further,
inasmuch as some room was left for a murder charge. But T can make his
threat increasingly credible by sinking costs in the form of expected penalties on the way to full execution. If V perceives this sunk-cost strategy,
then V will find the initial threat more credible and will be more likely to
submit at an earlier stage. In turn, the logic of the credibility effect now
implies that T will find threat-making more attractive in the first place.
Where the credibility effect can be reversed so successfully, it may
be a mistake to punish threats lightly. In these situations, marginal deterrence theory and the credibility effect suggest that law should choose its
line of defense. In some cases, the best strategy is to apply nearly maximum marginal deterrence to the first act of violence committed by T,
even if that is a threat of greater violence. The point is to defeat T's reversal of the credibility effect. Where the offender is able to sink costs,
and where victims will submit because they perceive that staging is a
winning strategy for the offender, the best deterrence strategy for law is
to focus its penalties, and to do so at an early stage, where T sinks costs
and where T's credibility is not yet enhanced. If armed robbers always
threaten, then pistol-whip, and then shoot nonsubmitting victimsbecause at that point these offenders have little to lose-then law would
do best by attacking pistol-whipping, which might be thought of as a
point of execution rather than as an enhanced threat, though of course it
is both.
Inasmuch as pistol-whipping is a battery, the TH-2/AA-3/AB-25
schedule may still be right." The important point is not to create two
modest gaps in an attempt to deter pistol-whipping and then also to deter
a shooting; what is needed is one large gap to maximize marginal deterrence. If, for example, AB represents aggravated battery and ABF refers
to the greater crime of aggravated battery with a firearm, as is true in
many criminal codes,' then law should schedule one large gap either between aggravated assault and aggravated battery or between aggravated
battery and aggravated battery with a firearm. The deterrent should not
55.

The schedule might as well be TH-2/AA-25/AB-0,

or equivalently, TH-2/AA-25/AB-25,

where one who commits an aggravated battery is simply charged for the threat, or the lesser-included
aggravated assault, except that there are cases where offenders simply shoot without first threatening.

56.

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3(e) (2017).
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be dissipated between the two gaps. TH-2/AA-3/AB-24/ABF is plausible,
as is 25TH-2/AA-3/AB-4/ABF-25. 7 Unfortunately, current law is best
described as dissipating rather than concentrating its deterrents."
On the other hand, and perhaps unintentionally, judges have interpreted criminal statutes in a way that comports with the first of these two
recommended schedules, and thus preserves some of the credibility effect. They have done this by interpreting "use of a firearm," or a similar
statutory expression, to include not only the discharge of a firearm, but
also pistol-whipping." This practice goes against the traditional schedule
in many states. Pistol-whipping, for example, is often distinguished from
discharge of a firearm, leaving a large gap between "armed with a firearm" and the discharge of the firearm."
Fortunately, there is another reason that strategic offenders cannot
easily reverse the credibility effect-offenders who sink costs often give
away their plans, allowing victims to defend and law enforcement to be
more effective. For example, an offender who plans to tunnel into a bank
vault must invest considerable resources in the hope of a large payoff.
But staging, or sinking costs, is unlikely to work. Imagine a criminal who
sends the following message to a bank: "Deliver $100,000 to me or I will
tunnel into one of your bank branches and take at least twice that
amount. The enclosed photos will show that my tunnel is well underway,
and it is cheap for me to complete it and finish the job." On the one
hand, the photos increase credibility because they show that the offender
57. The crime of kidnap presents a difficult case when it comes to parrying the criminal's sinking
of costs. In a ransom kidnap, the offender often sinks costs before threatening physical harm to the
hostage and of course law's heavy penalty for kidnap adds to the sunk cost. The threat of further violence is highly credible. One problem with lowering the penalty for the threat, or kidnap, is that the
victim's family might pay the ransom without involving the police. In this case there will be substitution towards the underdeterred crime. Kidnap should be thought of as violence, and law's deterrent
power should be focused on the kidnap even at the expense of some marginal deterrence with respect
to inflicting physical harm on the hostage.
58. The dissipating nature can be observed by applying Illinois criminal law to this hypothetical.
TH (theft, say pickpocketing a wallet) is punished with two to five years' incarceration. 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/16-1(b). AA (assault) generates up to one year imprisonment. Id. § 5/12-1(b). AB (aggravated
battery) is a Class 3 felony punishable by two to five years (though circumstances can increase this).

Id. § 5/18-3.05(h). ABF (aggravated battery with a firearm) is a Class X felony punishable by six to
thirty years. Id.
59. The pattern is likely to have less to do with insight about marginal deterrence and the credibility effect than with perceived toughness on criminals. See Montgomery v. State, 99 S.w.3d 257, 262
(Tex. App. 2003) (upholding defendant's aggravated assault conviction where the defendant exhibited
the firearm while threatening to pistol-whip victim); Rose v. Commonwealth., 673 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Va.

Ct. App. 2009) (holding that pistol-whipping during a robbery is use of a firearm in aggravated battery). The pattern extends to federal law. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 148 (1995) (holding
that "uses a firearm" means "active employment" and not mere possession of the firearm, under a
drug trafficking statute, though active employment does not require the discharge of the weapon).
After Bailey, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was amended to include mere possession. See Pub. L. 105-386,

§ 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000)).
60. In Illinois, for example, use of a deadly weapon and "discharge of a firearm" are distinguished, and pistol-whipping would fall under the former given that it is not technically a discharge.
The punishment for pistol-whipping, a Class 3 felony, is two to five years (but five to ten years with
aggravating circumstances). 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.05(h). Meanwhile, inasmuch as aggravated
battery by discharging a firearm is a Class X felony punishable by six to thirty years, there is a large

gap between pistol-whipping and shooting the victim. Id. § 5/12-3.05(g)(1)(C).
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is not a mere extortionist without the capacity to tunnel into a bank. On
the other hand, the bank can mount defenses at its branches, and police
can begin to look for evidence of tunneling near the branches owned by
the bank that is threatened.
Sinking costs is therefore a good strategy for a threatener only
where the victim has no time to respond or where defensive maneuvers
are very expensive. Criminal threats are most useful where they are specific and quick, as in the case of an armed robber, and it is in those cases
that law must not help the criminal by enhancing the credibility of his
threat with a heavy sanction. The discussion in this Part thus strengthens
the argument in Section III.A. Where general threats are concerned,6
one who threatens to harm a group in the future has allowed time for a
defense to be mounted, so that the threat is not terribly credible. In any
event, law normally attaches no sanction to a general threat so that maximum marginal deterrence also discourages the threatener's returning to
harm the group.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has introduced two new dimensions to deterrence in
criminal law and suggested that these dimensions, or credibility effects,
reinforce the importance of marginal rather than direct deterrence. We
have pointed to the harm that law can do when it punishes threats severely. The criminal sanction operates as a sunk cost, reduces marginal
deterrence, makes the escalation of criminal activity more likely, and
makes crime itself more profitable. It is of course impossible to identify
every situation where decriminalization or light sanctions for threats are
unambiguously desirable, especially because much depends on the likelihood that victims will have time to reason about the likelihood that a
threat will be executed. Law must be fairly general in its application, but
criminals, victims, and their circumstances are heterogeneous. They will
not uniformly assess the probability of apprehension, and that probability will, in fact, change with location, time of day, the criminal's skill, and
the victim's behavior before, during, and after a threat or its execution.
Criminals may also have disparate costs of escalation and different rates
of success with their threats. Neither statutes nor after-the-fact judges
can specify and identify these differences. It is necessary to generalize
about the credibility of threats and the value of criminal penalties.
This Article has, however, demonstrated that lawmakers must resist
the temptation to follow the proportionality principle all the way to the
point where criminal law offers a long list of crimes of increasing severity
accompanied by incrementally increasing penalties. This sort of schedule
of criminal sanctions dissipates marginal deterrence and, most importantly, makes criminal threats more credible and more valuable to criminals.
In many settings, the solution is to dramatically reduce the penalty asso61.

See supraPart III.
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ciated with a threat-even if the threat is as serious as one made by an
armed robber who demands money and threatens to shoot if the victim
fails to submit. Law should focus its deterrent power on the shooting rather than the threat, which is to say the aggravated battery rather than
the aggravated assault. By doing so, the threat itself will become less
credible and less valuable.
In some situations, criminals can sink costs, perhaps simply by beginning to execute their threats, in order to make their threats more
credible, and thus more likely to gain submission from their victims. In
these cases, law should focus its deterrent power on a single point, likely
the first display of violence, even if that violence is a threat of a more serious harm. To do otherwise is to empower the criminal.
Where an ongoing criminal or terrorist organization is concerned,
primary credibility is so great that deterrence is again best focused on the
initial stage of wrongdoing. In practice, legislators devise special statutes
to combat these threat-making machines. They might focus on "conspiracy," "racketeering," "terrorism," or even on membership in a recognized criminal enterprise or terrorist organization.6 2 Common criminals
are best deterred by lowering, rather than raising, the sanctions for criminal threats, but because organized crime is an expert at sinking costs and
establishing credibility, the best deterrence might well be to aim at the
organization's threats or first displays of violence, rather than its executions.
Most criminals use an element of surprise and cannot afford to sink
costs and reverse the credibility effect to their own advantage because to
do so is to give victims the opportunity to defend or call for help. In virtually all these cases, lawmakers must recognize that, when law's sanctions increase the credibility of offenders' threats, law itself is part of the
problem. Penalties must be rescheduled to focus law's deterrent power
on the danger of escalation or execution of threats. In this way, threats
and other gateway crimes, though lightly sanctioned, will become less
profitable to offenders.

62. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Effective National and International Action Against Organized
Crime and Terrorist CriminalActivities, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 9 (1990); Zvi Joseph, The Application
of RICO to InternationalTerrorism, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1071 (1990) (assembling statutes and terms
that are presently and potentially used to reach organized crime and terrorist activity).
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